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1. Introduction 
The key ambition of this paper is to challenge the steadfast conclusion of the Danish Study of 
Power and Democracy (1998-2004) that holds that societal, political and democratic 
developments in the past 30-40 years have not resulted in a systematic weakening of the 
parliamentary chain of governance (Christiansen and Togeby, 2006). The paper argues that a 
plethora of local forms of governance has proliferated and claims that this proliferation 
problematizes the idea that power and democracy are firmly anchored in the sovereign people 
who elects the parliament that in turn controls the government, which governs the public 
administration through a regulative and normative system of bureaucratic rule. The production 
of policy outputs and policy outcomes in the decentralized Danish welfare state is to a wide 
extent a result of institutionalized forms of pluri-centric interaction between fragmented public 
authorities and a variety of private actors. In the emerging system of interactive and negotiated 
governance, the elected politicians often play a marginal role and the public administrators are 
at best primus inter pares. The mechanisms of accountability are weak and transparency is 
partial. Hence, the ability of the territorially defined citizenry to control policy outputs and 
policy outcomes through their elected representatives and their executive leadership of the 
public administrators is limited.  
 
My argument against the overly optimistic conclusion of the Danish Study of Power and 
Democracy hinges on an empirical mapping of the local forms of governance in Denmark. 
However, the absence of commonly accepted typologies of the different institutional forms of 
local governance and the lack of comprehensive empirical studies and centrally available data 
sources means that the empirical mapping will be explorative and somewhat sketchy. 
Nevertheless, the paper aims to characterize and assess the Danish mix of local forms of 
governance vis-à-vis the governance mix found in the other Nordic countries and to explain the 
Danish local governance profile by reference to historical, institutional and political factors.  
 
The paper is prompted by research conducted within the Nordic Network of Democratic 
Network Governance that is coordinated by the Centre for Democratic Network Governance at 
Roskilde University. A high degree of social equality, a high level of education, the 
development of a well-organized civil society, political commitment to an inclusive society and 
strong democratic traditions tend to make the Nordic countries an interesting laboratory for 
studying the development and implications of different forms of collaborative governance. The 
Nordic countries have large public sectors and the delivery of public welfare service is 
decentralized to the local municipalities that have considerable power and political autonomy. 
The high degree of decentralization explains why the present study focuses on the local forms 
of governance. 
 
Governance is a notoriously slippery term that has different meanings in different contexts. 
However, at the most general level, it refers to the production of public value in the broad sense 
of visions and values, common definitions of problems, information gathering, planning, 
coordination, decision making and concrete regulations. Hence, in contrast to the notion of 
‘government’ that refers to a set of formal institutions, the notion of ‘governance’ refers to the 
formal and informal processes through which public value is produced. The present paper 
focuses on ‘local forms of governance’ that are defined as the relatively institutionalized 
processes of negotiated interaction that bring together public and private actors with the 
purpose of formulating, implementing or evaluating public policy at the local level. From this 
definition it follows that New Public Management inspired attempts to enhance competition 
rather than negotiation by means of privatization, contracting out and commercialization of the 
public sector are excluded from this study of local forms of governance. For studies of the path 
dependent impact of the New Public Management discourse on the public sector in Denmark I 
shall refer to studies by Rod Rhodes (1999) and Karin Bryntse and Carsten Greve (2002). Inter-
municipal cooperation clearly falls within the definition of local forms of governance, but a 
further study will have to wait as it will take some time before the Danish municipalities have 
reconsidered their need for inter-municipal cooperation in the light of the Local Government 
Reform that from 2007 reduces the number of Danish municipalities from 275 to 98 and the 
number of Danish counties from 14 to 5.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows,. Section 2 summarizes and critically reviews the conclusion of 
the Danish Study of Power and Democracy in order to show that the proliferation of local forms 
of governance cannot be reduced to a small and insignificant amendment to Johan P. Olsen’s 
parliamentary chain of governance. Section 3 aims to define what I mean by governance and 
local forms of governance. Section 4 presents an empirical mapping of the local forms of 
governance in Denmark. Section 5 aims to characterize the local forms of governance and 
invokes historical, institutional and political factors in order to explain their proliferation. In 
section 6, the paper is concluded with a summary of the key findings and a brief discussion of 
the need to assess the contribution of the local forms of governance to effective and democratic 
governance. 
 
2. Government and governance: the revenge of the supplement 
The Nordic countries have strong social-democratic legacies and place a high value on social 
equality and democracy. During the Cold War, the Scandinavian core of the Nordic countries, 
which consists of Denmark Norway and Sweden, defined their national identity in terms of 
being better than Europe (Wæver, 1992). Not only were the Scandinavian countries opposed to 
the militaristic rivalry between East and West, they also claimed to have invented a Third Way 
between the socialist planned economy and the capitalist market economy and to have crafted a 
model society based on a combination of individual freedom and an egalitarian and inclusive 
democracy. With democracy as a constitutive part of their national identity it is quite 
understandable why the Scandinavian states have initiated and funded a number of research-
based studies of power and democracy. Such studies were carried out in Norway in 1972-81 
and again in 1997-2003; in Sweden in 1985-1990 and again in 1997-2000; and in Denmark in 
1997-2003. 
 
At the outset, the Danish Study of Power and Democracy applied a relatively broad conception 
of power and democracy and welcomed empirical analyses of concrete policy processes 
(Danish Study of Power and Democracy, 1998; Sørensen and Torfing, 2001). The final report 
from the research leadership of the Danish power studies power and democracy is still 
conceived in broad terms, but the conclusion is primarily concerned with the ‘democratic 
robustness of the political institutions’ vis-à-vis new developments (Togeby et al., 2003: 402-
405). The executive summary of the Danish Study of Power and Democracy that was recently 
published by Lise Togeby and Peter Munk Christiansen (2006) focuses exclusively on the 
challenges to parliamentary democracy. The clear-cut conclusion advanced by Christiansen and 
Togeby is both reassuring and surprising: ‘Looking back over the past 30-40 years, we cannot 
find evidence to conclude that the parliamentary chain of governance has suffered severe 
damage’ (Christiansen and Togeby, 2006: 22). Despite several waves of globalization, 
decentralization and privatization, the parliamentary chain of governance has not been 
subjected to any systematic weakening. There is no reason to worry as the chain of governance, 
which ideally links the sovereign people to elected members of parliament, a responsible 
government and the responsive public administration, is still intact. The bourgeoning 
governance literature that claims that representative democracy and the traditional forms of 
party government is threatened by a simultaneous displacement of political power and control 
upwards to international and supranational organizations, outwards to multi-level governance 
networks, and downwards to decentralized forms of collaborative governance is proved wrong, 
at least in the case of Denmark. 
 
Christiansen and Togeby take the notion of the ‘parliamentary chain of governance’ from the 
Norwegian political scientist Johan P. Olsen (1978). The parliamentary chain of governance 
provides a normative standard for assessing the current state of democracy in Denmark. It 
prescribes that power is anchored in the sovereign people whose principal function is to elect 
the parliament (‘folketinget’) through free and fair elections in which political parties compete 
for office. Parliament defines the laws and controls the government that must be in harmony 
with the parliamentary majority. The government is responsible for executing and 
implementing the legislation produced by the parliament through the legal-administrative 
system of bureaucratic rule. The public administration is supposed to be neutral and unpolitical, 
and policy implementation is supervised and controlled by the government and the individual 
ministers. The parliamentary principle grants decisive power to the parliament as the 
government can only remain in power so long as there is not a parliamentary majority against it. 
In such a parliamentary system, judicial power is only supposed to play a marginal role as. It is 
must not reduce the power of the parliament.  
 
According to Christiansen and Togeby (2002: 5), the threat to the parliamentary chain of 
governance can come either from a weakening of the different links in the chain or from 
political actors who are not part of the chain of governance, but hold significant political power 
and are capable of influencing public policy making. However, despite a number of ‘significant 
challenges’ and ‘negative elements’ revealed by the Danish Study of Power and Democracy, 
the overall conclusion is that the parliamentary chain of governance is as strong as ever.  
 
According to Christiansen and Togeby, there is little evidence that the individual links in the 
chain of governance have been weakened. Membership of political parties, which used to link 
voters and politicians, has declined, but voter turnout is still high, the individual capacities of 
the voters are strengthened, and the mass media have taken over the task of connecting the 
people with the elected politicians (2002: 5-7). It is increasingly difficult for the Danish 
parliament to exercise effective control over the government’s role and strategies within the 
EU, but at a more general level the prevalence of minority governments after the earthquake 
election in 1973, which doubled the number of parties in the Danish parliament, has 
strengthened parliament’s control over the government and the replacement of the former ad 
hoc based parliamentary committees with new standing committees in early 1970s has 
reinforced the parliament’s role in the preparation of new legislation (2002: 7-9). Finally, 
although the absence of politically appointed civil servants makes the politicians dependent on 
political advice from career civil servants, the increasing use of time limited employment 
contracts for top-level bureaucrats, and the strict budgetary control that has been exercised by 
the Ministry of Finance since the early 1980s tend to ensure the political-administrative 
leadership of the government and the responsiveness of the public administration (2002: 9-10).  
 
Christiansen and Togeby (2002: 10-18) admit that other political actors have gained increasing 
importance and, potentially, might undermine the primacy of the parliamentary chain of 
governance. First of all, the judicial power has gain prominence and there is as an increasing 
judicialization of Danish society and the Danish courts have increasingly assumed a legislative 
role. Second, the mass media have gained a more independent role and tend to affect the 
political agenda and shape the political attitudes of the people by the way they select stories, 
sources and frames. Last but not least, political globalization in terms of Europeanization and 
the growing importance of international organizations has both a direct and an indirect affect on 
Danish legislation. However, Christiansen and Togeby do not find these tendencies particularly 
alarming. The judicialization of Danish society strengthens the respect for the individual and 
tightens the control with the administration’s exercise of power. The politicians gradually learn 
how to use the mass media to get their message across, and there is still considerable national 
latitude vis-à-vis the influence from the EU. In addition, the influence of large interest 
organizations is weakened as the number of corporatist commissions and councils engaged in 
the preparation of national legislation is in sharp decline. Individual business firms are active 
lobbyists, but the impact of ‘big business’ on actual legislation is limited. As such, the 
parliamentary chain of governance has not lost power to political actors outside the chain. 
  
All in all, the argument put forth by Christiansen and Togeby is clear and sound. They might be 
criticized for ignoring the contributions of those researchers from the Danish power studies who 
are sceptical about the continued primacy of the parliamentary chain of governance (Bang, 
Dyrberg and Hoff, 2005; Bogason and Gjelstrup, 2004; and Torfing, 2004). They might also be 
criticized for presenting a far too unambiguous conclusion that is not warranted by their own 
argument that actually lists a large number of negative aspects. However, the problem I want to 
raise is a different one. It relates to the linkage between the public administration and the 
citizens, which is dealt with in an inadequate way that hides the real challenge to the 
parliamentary chain of governance: the surge of a plurality of local forms of governance that 
undermines the voters’ ability to control the outputs and outcomes through their voting 
behaviour. 
 
Towards the end of their executive summary, Christiansen and Togeby (2002: 18) return to 
discuss the link between the public administration and the citizens, which for some reason is 
only briefly mentioned in conjunction with the other links. They admit that the citizens are not 
passive objects of administrative decisions and provisions such as the original model of the 
parliamentary chain of governance assumes. The citizens are actively involved in the 
implementation of public policy. Since the direct involvement of the citizens in decisions that 
have a bearing on their lives is in strict accordance with democratic appraisal of the sovereign 
people, Christiansen and Togeby amend the original model by adding an extra arrow pointing 
from the citizens to the public administration. The supplement indicates that the citizens are in 
fact capable of participating in and affecting the implementation of public policy (2002: 4-5, 
18). As such, it helps to safeguard the parliamentary chain of governance by making a minor 
concession to the fact that there is something that escapes the original formulation of the 
parliamentary chain of governance. The parliamentary chain of governance is by no means 
challenged by this seemingly innocent addition of the possibility for citizens to have a direct 
influence on the outputs and outcomes. On the contrary, the parliamentary chain of governance 
is claimed to be strengthened by the ‘observable increase in participation in connection with the 
implementation of political decisions’ (2002: 20). 
 
The problem is just that the supplement, which completes and safeguards the parliamentary 
chain of governance, is by no means an innocent addition that leaves the parliamentary chain of 
governance intact. By contrast, I shall claim, first, that the supplement introduces a different 
logic of governance that questions the primacy of the parliamentary chain of governance. 
Echoing the French philosopher Jacques Derrida (1974: 141-64), I shall claim that the 
supplement introduced by Christiansen and Togeby is indeed a ‘dangerous supplement’ that 
takes its revenge by destabilizing the traditional hierarchy between the privileged forms of 
government and the inferior forms of local governance. 
 
The active participation of empowered citizens in activities on the output side of the political 
system cannot, as Christiansen and Togeby (2002: 19) seem to suggest, be reduced to a new 
form of ‘individualized participation’ that can be studied through quantitative surveys that 
measure the extent to which different groups of citizens participate in different kinds of 
activities in order to influence the provision of public services such as schools, childcare and 
healthcare. In Denmark the active and competent involvement of individual and organized 
citizens is channelled through local forms of governance that introduce a governmental logic 
that is different from the logics of parliamentary government and representative democracy. 
Hence, whereas the traditional forms of parliamentary government are based on sovereignty, 
hierarchy and control, the local forms of governance are based on plurality, interdependency 
and coordination. Whereas representative democracy is based on universal citizenship, 
competition and representation, democratic forms of governance are based on affectedness, 
deliberation and participation. To put it graphically: whereas the parliamentary chain of 
governance is basically a linear model, the local forms of governance introduces a much more 
complex model with crisscrossing relations and interactions among a plurality of  processes, 
institutions and actors – not unlike what Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1987) describe as a 
rhizome.  
 
Although the local forms of governance create a governmental space that in several ways is 
incompatible with the logic implicit to the parliamentary chain of governance, it is not 
completely divorced from the traditional institutions of government. Public authorities at 
different levels play an import role in relation to the local forms of governance, both as a 
central and resourceful participant in the negotiated interactions that formulate and implement 
local policies and as a metagovernor that aims to design, monitor and influence the interactive 
processes of local policy making. Hence, the local forms of governance are by no means a 
‘government free zone’, but rather an arena where traditional forms of government are caught 
in an interactive game characterized by a high degree of self-regulation that takes place in the 
shadow of hierarchical metagovernance (Sørensen 2007).    
 
The local forms of governance introduce a governmental logic that is foreign to the 
parliamentary chain of governance, but they also undermine its primacy. Even the most well-
functioning governance chain linking the sovereign people to parliament, government and 
public bureaucracy will fail to control and master the local forms of governance. The attempt to 
ensure government control by means of metagoverning the local forms of governance is 
constrained by the fact that local politicians often play a marginal role in the negotiated 
interactions through which local policies are formulated and implemented. Local public 
authorities are represented by public administrators that often have a very long leash in the 
negotiations with the private stakeholders. To make things even worse, both the politicians and 
the voters are left in the dark as to what goes on in the local forms of governance since 
transparency and publicity is limited. One might object that there is no problem as long as the 
citizens have a direct influence on outputs and outcomes through their participation in the local 
forms of governance. However, we must not confuse the individual citizens and organized 
stakeholders that are participating in the local forms of governance with the sovereign people in 
which the parliamentary chain of governance is supposedly anchored. The private participants 
in the local forms of governance do not constitute a unified and homogenous ‘people’ and they 
do not express the general will of the people. Rather, they constitute a fragmented ‘patchwork’ 
of empowered individuals, business firms and civil society organizations that hold conflicting 
visions of the common good and who gain access to the local policy arenas because they claim 
to be intensely affected by the outputs and outcomes. 
 
The local forms of governance reduce the sovereign people’s ability to control political outputs 
and outcomes through the parliamentary chain of command. One might even argue that the 
parliamentary chain of governance is transformed by the proliferation of local forms of 
governance. Hence, although the total amount of legislation is increasing, the form and content 
of the laws is changing as ‘formal laws’ that provide detailed descriptions of how to deal with 
different cases are increasingly replaced by ‘material laws’ that merely define the overall means 
and ends and ‘reflexive laws’ that specify the procedures for how public authorities and private 
stakeholders interact in the production and implementation of public regulation (Dalberg-
Larsen, 1999). 
 
3. The meaning of governance 
The ubiquity of the notion of ‘governance’ has not been matched with conceptual precision in 
defining the concept, and the notion of ‘local forms of governance’ is often used imprecisely to 
colloquial references to different forms of sub-national policy making. Therefore, before 
proceeding with an empirical mapping of the local forms of governance, a further clarification 
of the notion of governance and a tentative definition of local forms of governance is required.  
 Today, everybody talks about governance. Governance has become a highly fashionable 
umbrella concept encompassing a wide range of social phenomena and academic references. 
The French used the notion of ‘gouvernance’ back in the 17th Century, but the recent 
governance revolution began in Germany in the late 1970s and early 1980s where the Bielefelt 
project started to problematize the traditional forms of governance in terms of hierarchy and 
markets and to search for alternative modes of governance based on institutionalized 
collaboration among a plurality of public and private actors. This line of inquiry was later taken 
up by Dutch colleagues such as Jan Kooiman and Walter Kickert who raised debates about the 
forms and content of ‘modern governance’. This development was paralleled by the research on 
network types of governance that was conducted by Anglo-American researchers such as Hugh 
Heclo, Brinton Milward, Keith Provan, Dave Marsh and Rod Rhodes, who approached the 
notion of governance from the perspective of neo-corporatism and corporate pluralism. The 
new emphasis on ‘governance’ rather ‘government’ gradually found its way into the discourse 
of prominent international and supranational organizations like the World Bank, the OECD and 
the EU that were looking for a response to the mounting problems of government overload, 
ungovernability and the lack of democratic legitimacy (Peters and Pierre, 2004). 
  
Despite the many political and scholarly debates on governance the notion of ‘governance’ 
remains a notoriously slippery term. In its most fundamental conceptual sense it refers to the 
collective steering of the economy and society through the production of public value in the 
broad sense of visions and values, common problem definitions, information gathering, 
planning, coordination, decision making and concrete regulations. The congruence of the 
formal political institutions, the structures of economic and social life, and the normative 
commitments of civil society has since the 17th century provided the historical conditions for 
territorially-defined governments to become the central locus of governance. However, the 
deterritorialization of political, economic and social life and the increasing diversification of 
civil society have problematized the national governments’ capacity for hierarchical steering 
and spurred the search for alternative steering mechanisms. Whereas the New Public 
Management movement recommends an increasing use of market forces and management 
techniques from private enterprises, the new governance literature emphasizes: the need for 
negotiated interaction among a plurality of public and private actors; the institutionalization of 
arenas and mechanisms facilitating interaction based on interdependency and trust; and the 
introduction of softer governance mechanisms emphasizing the role of common standards, 
mutual learning and interorganizational cooperation. As a result, the contemporary conception 
of governance tends to refer to non-hierarchical attempts to steer the economy and society 
through institutionalized negotiations that aim at transforming and coordinating public and 
private interests, actions and resources. 
 
Nevertheless, the governance literature continues to offer competing definitions of governance 
that are emphasizing different aspects. Holger Bähr, Gerda Falkner and Oliver Treib (2005) 
have identified three different definitions of governance in the current literature. In some parts 
of the literature governance refers to the formal and informal interaction whereby social and 
political actors translate diverging preferences into more or less effective policy choices. 
Governance is here defined in terms of a new type of politics. In other parts of the literature, 
governance is defined as a system of rules and norms that shape the pattern of interaction 
among the social and political actors. In such definitions governance is defined as a new form 
of polity that sustains pluri-centric and voluntary policy coordination. Finally, there are 
attempts to define governance as a new way of solving policy problems or reaching particular 
goals by means of non-binding norms, voluntary agreements and horizontal coordination. 
Governance is here used to describe a new kind of policy. The competing definitions of 
governance in terms of a new politics, polity or policy are sometimes combined, or merged, in 
broad definitions of governance as the totality of interactions in which public and private actors 
aim to solve public problems or create opportunities while attending to a set of institutional 
rules and establishing a normative foundation for joint action (Kooiman, 1993). This definition 
highlights four important aspects of contemporary governance: 1) governance is a result of 
interaction that is prompted either by resource dependence or the wish to influence policy 
decisions; 2) governance blurs the distinction between the public and the private as it brings to 
individual or collective actors from state, market and civil society; 3) governance is based on 
negotiations, conflicts and non-majoritarian decisions that are regulated by an emerging 
institutionalization of the rules of the game; 4) governance aims to establish a normative 
foundation for the formulation and implementation of policy. 
On the basis of this definition of governance, we might refer to ‘local forms of governance’ as 
the relatively institutionalized processes of negotiated interaction that bring together public and 
private actors with the purpose of formulating, implementing or evaluating public policy at the 
local level. I shall talk about local forms of governance in the plural in order to emphasize the 
many different institutional arrangements that facilitate the production of public value through 
public-private interaction. 
 
The mapping of the multiplicity of local forms of governance that are typically found in Danish 
municipalities is an inductive enterprise. It is based on a tentative typology that is informed by 
theoretical and empirical pre-understandings arising from the literature on local governance. 
The typology merely serves the heuristic purpose of distinguishing among different institutional 
arrangements according to their shifting balance between the formal and informal rules, norms 
and procedures that facilitate and regulate the negotiated interaction of public and private 
stakeholders. The provisional typology that will structure the mapping of the local forms of 
governance in Denmark contains the following categories that are ordered according to the 
increasing importance of informal rules, norms and procedures and the increasing participation 
of civil society actors rather than market actors: 
 
a. Municipal companies 
The municipalities can contribute to the financing and participate in the leadership of 
public-private companies that are engaged in the production and sale of products and 
services based on know-how developed in the public sector. Such companies are not a 
part of the bureaucratic chain of command in the municipality as executive decisions 
are taken by the corporate board in which both the public and private owners are 
represented. 
     
b. Public foundations and funds 
Public foundations are formal institutions based on a written constitution that describes 
a general purpose. They are self-owned companies and enjoy complete autonomy as 
they are governed by an independent board that often consists of both public and 
private actors. Public foundations are independent legal entities that can sign contracts 
with the municipality about the delivery of particular public services. Some 
foundations, like the European Social Fund and several national funds, are not engaged 
in public regulation or service production, but merely have a funding function. 
However, these funds will often be funding local projects based on public-private 
cooperation. 
 
c. Public-private partnerships (PPPs) 
PPPs are relatively formal systems in which public service or private business venture 
are funded and operated through a long-term partnership between a government 
agency and one or more private sector companies. The public and private partners 
retain their independency, but engage in continuous cooperation. 
 
d. Public consultations 
Public consultations are often founded on legally prescribed procedures for 
consultation of citizens and stakeholders in relation to new plans or developments. 
However, recently, a new and much more informal and interactive consultation 
process has emerged. 
 
e. Collaborative boards 
Collaborative boards are institutionalized mechanisms for sector-specific cooperation 
between public and private actors. They are governed by formal and informal rules and 
often have limited formal competence. They give advice to the City Council or public 
managers, but they might have the own financial means, which they can use to finance 
they own projects. There are three different kinds of collaborative boards: cooperative 
committees, user or stakeholder boards, and board-like governance networks. 
 
f. Supra-local network forums 
Supra-local network forums are mandatory, but loosely-coupled, governance networks 
that bring together regional authorities, local mayors and private actors such as local 
business firms in governance networks that are responsible for developing plans and 
policy that can enhance growth and employment at the regional and local levels.  
 g. Sub-local committees, councils and networks 
The citizens may be appointed to local committees, elected to local councils, or 
participate in local governance networks that aim to bring together the local citizens 
and give them some influence on local issues. The different institutional arrangements 
are operating at the sub-local level and their goal is to enhance the local sustainability. 
 
h. Project-related governance networks 
Project-related governance networks are informal governance networks that are 
formed on an ad hoc basis and in relation to new public development projects. They 
are often initiated by public administrators who aim to enhance input and out 
legitimacy, but they might also be self-grown in the sense of emerging out the regular 
contacts between public and private actors.  
 
 
4. Mapping local forms of governance in Denmark 
There are no data bases that systematically register local forms of governance in terms of types, 
numbers, scope and functioning. Neither are there any comprehensive empirical studies of local 
forms of governance in Denmark. Rather, what we have is a number of singular studies of 
particular forms of local governance. The closest we get to a comprehensive analysis is Peter 
Bogason’s study of democracy and network governance in the decentralized Danish 
municipalities published in 2001. In this mapping exercise I shall draw extensively on 
Bogason’s analysis, which will be combined with insights from my own research and 
information from public reports and websites and from personal interviews with executive 
managers from Danish municipalities. The lack of systematic data collection means that my 
analysis will be somewhat impressionistic, but until Danish public administration researchers 
begin to look more closely at the multiple forms of local governance and finds ways of 
recording and registering institutional forms of local governance in a systematic way, we will 
have to be content with this kind of impressionistic explorations. 
 
 
4.1 Municipal companies 
The most common form of municipal companies are the local delivery companies in the field of 
water and energy supply and renovation that are 100% owned by the municipality and are based 
on the ‘break-even principle’, according to which the costs  must be completely covered by the 
consumers. These companies do not give rise to public-private collaboration. However, Law # 
384 from 1992 provides the opportunity for Danish municipalities to participate financially and 
in the leadership of public-private companies if these are engaged in activities that aim to 
develop municipal know-how or to sell products and services based on publicly developed 
know-how to others than municipalities. The new 2006 Law # 548 abandons the previous 
restrictions on the financial contribution of the municipalities, but requires that the private 
partner must contribute at least 25% of the joint capital in the company and that no municipality 
must command the majority in the corporate board. In 2006, there were registered 252 
companies involved in municipal participation. This is slightly less than in 2005 when there 
were 39 companies more. Most of the municipal companies are organized as joint-stock 
companies, but there are also a considerable number of limited companies. The majority of the 
municipal companies are involved in activities in the areas of energy, renovation and traffic. 
However, there are also many examples of municipal companies engaged in local business 
development projects. The municipalities’ financial contribution to the companies varies a lot. 
All the municipalities participate in the corporate board in which the executive decisions are 
made. 
 
Sources:  
 
• Christensen, Christiansen and Ibsen (2006), Ch. 8. 
• Danish Commerce and Companies Agency: 
http://www.eogs.dk/graphics/publikationer/Selskaber%20og%20Fonde/komred06.pdf 
 
4.2 Public foundations and funds 
Municipalities can participate in the construction of a public foundation by drafting a written 
constitution, putting in public money and appointing an independent board. When the 
foundation is established, the municipality cannot take any money out of the foundation and it 
has no control over its dispositions. The foundation is a self-owned company run by the board 
that must act to fulfil the objective stated in the written constitution. However, the foundation is 
an autonomous legal entity that can enter a contract with the municipality about delivery of 
public service the production of which is paid for by the municipality. In Danish legislation 
there is a distinction between business foundations and non-business foundations. Whereas the 
former are engaged in the production and sale of products and services or the administration of 
buildings, the latter aim to fulfil some kind of public purpose. The construction of foundations 
is regulated by Law # 652. There is no systematic knowledge about the municipalities’ 
participation in the construction of public foundations or the number contracts they have signed 
with different kinds of foundations. However, public foundations are frequently found in the 
area of business development and social services. 
 
The 1980s saw the emergence of a series of large government sponsored funds that were set up 
by different ministries and aimed at funding local projects and experiments, particularly in the 
field of social policy. One of the first was the social development fund (the SUM programme) 
that was established in 1988 and funded more that 1,500 local projects. The SUM programme 
aimed to stimulate the development of new methods in social work, initiatives targeting 
particular social groups, and the involvement of new actors. The programme was administered 
by a board consisting of nine experts, stakeholders and representatives from the Ministry of 
Social Affairs. Most of the projects that were funded were anchored in local organizations. 43% 
were run by public organizations, 37% by private organizations, and 17% were co-governed by 
public and private actors. 75% of the local projects had established an Advisory Board with 
both public and private participants. Another important public fund was the Neighbourhood 
Renewal Found that was established in 1997. It funded seven large scale neighbourhood 
renewal projects that were organized as partnerships, networks and alliances. In 2002 a new 
neighbourhood renewal program was established by the Ministry of Integration that shifted the 
focus to integration and employment issues. It has funded five new neighbourhood renewal 
projects in socially deprived areas. 
 
The national programmes have been supplemented by the European Social Fund that has 
supported a large number of smaller projects in the field of regional development, social policy 
and employment policy. Although many of these are anchored in public organizations, there are 
a lot of private participants. The formation of local partnerships is also a common practice. 
 
Sources: 
 
• Peter Bogason (2001), Ch. 6 
• Lars Engberg et al. (2000) 
• Civil Affairs Agency: 
http://www.erstatningsnaevnet.dk/fondskontor/fonde.aspx 
• Telephone interview with legal manager from the Civil Affairs Agency 
     
4.3 Public-Private Partnerships 
The classical form of ‘contracting out’, whereby local governments define a particular public 
service in a contract and pay a private company that is selected in open competition with other 
firms to produce and deliver it, is the most typical way of organising public private interaction 
in the Danish municipality. However, in this kind of public-private interaction there is no 
cooperative negotiation as conflicts are solved through arbitration. The goal of contracting out 
is to enhance of competition and this explains why contracting out is not included in the 
definition of local forms of governance. By contrast, Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are 
mechanisms for public-private cooperation where the local government and private firms share 
both the responsibility and the financing of a particular public service or business venture. The 
public and private partners remain independent actors, but engage in continuous cooperation 
and resolve conflicts through negotiation. PPPs have been introduced in order to encourage 
private investment in public infrastructure projects. Hence, a typical PPP example would be a 
hospital building financed and constructed by private developers and then leased to the hospital 
authority that runs the medical service. Another example would be where a local government 
sells an asset, a school building, for example, and then leases it back from the financial partner 
with which the government is cooperating.  
 
Despite the Danish government’s encouragement of the public authorities’ use of PPPs in 
relation to infrastructure projects, there is only one example of a public service facility that is 
built by a private consortium and then leased and operated by the public authority, namely 
Vildbjerg School in the municipality of Herning. However, this type of PPP is expected to 
multiply in the future, and in several other municipalities, there are preparations of PPPs in 
relation to large infrastructure projects. The other type of sale-and-lease-back PPP is more 
popular. In the late 1990s around 20 Danish municipalities had entered into sale-and-lease-back 
arrangements. However, a major scandal in the municipality of Farum, where the mayor has 
been accused of malpractice in relation to his highly creative use of sale-and-lease-back 
arrangements might deter other municipalities from going down that road. The scandal has 
prompted a series of law revisions that also less sale-and-lease-back arrangements less 
attractive for the municipalities. 
 
Sources:  
 
• Carsten Greve (2003). 
• Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority: http://www.ebst.dk/ops  
• Interview with senior manager from KL (Local Government Denmark) 
 
4.4 Public consultations 
Since 1975 Danish legislation has prescribed a detailed procedure for consultation of local 
citizens and stakeholders in relation to municipal plans and local plans. The municipal plan is a 
comprehensive plan that sets the course for the development of the municipality as a whole. 
The elaboration of municipal plans is mandatory and follows a four years cycle. Local plans are 
physical plans that define how a particular geographical area is going to be used and developed. 
Local plans must be revised whenever new activities give rise to major changes in the existing 
regulations and rules. The City Council have an unlimited right to create and revise local plans 
for specific areas of varying size and there are made more 1000 new local plans in Denmark 
every year. The planning law requires that the local citizens are informed and involved as much 
as possible in the municipal and local planning processes. The plans are made public in local 
newspapers, the City Hall, public libraries, etc. and the citizens can send mails and letters with 
comments, questions and objections. In case of large and significant changes a public meeting 
must be held at which the local politicians will meet and discuss issues with citizens and 
stakeholder organizations. Still, it is entirely up to the politicians in City Council to decide how 
to react to the suggestions and objections from the citizens and the stakeholders. Although the 
consultation processes tend to lead to many big and small changes, participation is limited and 
the citizens are only consulted in the final stage of the planning process where it is difficult to 
make changes. Moreover, except for the public meetings, there is not much interaction in 
relation to the municipal and local planning process. The same goes for the public consultations 
in relation to the issuing of environmental permissions to business firms or farmers who want to 
make large changes in their production facilities. 
 
However, new and much more interactive forms of public consultation are under way. One 
example is the local Agenda 21 groups who are involved in negotiations with the local 
authorities over environmental initiatives. Another interesting example is the recent formation 
of Local Action Groups (LAGs) that are established in the rural areas and consist of local 
citizens, civil society organizations, private firms and local politicians. The LAGs aim to 
enhance the quality of life in the countryside by creating new forms of business and 
employment in old farm houses, expanding public service facilities in rural areas and 
contributing to the local planning process through the elaboration of a strategic development 
plan. According to the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries, there will be formed more 
than 50 LAGs in 2007. 
 
Sources: 
 
• The Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries: http://www.dffe.dk/ 
• Law # 316 
 
4.5 Collaborative boards 
Collaborative boards are sector-specific forums for public-private interaction that refer to the 
City Council or the management of local public institutions. Three different types of 
collaborative boards can be distinguished: 
 
i. Cooperative committees are established under the City Council in order to include 
relevant private actors in public governance. The City Council constitutes a number 
of standing committees where the council members work together on case 
processing assisted by public administrators. Although it has been possible to invite 
representatives from organizations to the committee meetings, the local politicians 
have generally been quite sceptical about this kind of local corporatism. However, 
the new 2006 Law # 1060 concerning Municipal Governance opens up the 
possibility for the constitution of ad hoc committees with a mixed representation of 
politicians, administrators and civil society organizations. However, it is too early to 
say how much this new opening will be used. However, there is one area where the 
participation of civil society organizations is mandatory and that is in the area of 
Public Enlightenment, which covers support and development of the activities of 
private associations in culture, sports, etc. Here civil society organizations 
participate in the allocation of local funding and the crafting of local development 
plans.  
 
ii. User or stakeholder boards are elected or appointed bodies that enable either the 
actual users of public services, or some relevant stakeholders, to influence the 
service delivery of decentralized public institutions. User boards are established in 
relation to a public service institution and the user representatives are elected by the 
users of the particular institution. There is a long tradition for user boards in relation 
to public schools and local churches. However, in the late 1980s, the Danish 
parliament decided that there should be user boards in all educational institutions 
and day care facilities. There are also a lot of non-mandatory user boards, for 
example, in relation to public libraries, elderly people’s homes, sports facilities and 
local business development. In the Danish gymnasiums and the technical schools, 
the user boards have been transformed into stakeholder boards to which a number of 
actors with special interests and competences in youth education are appointed. 
Participation in the local elections of the user representatives is very low, but in the 
public schools that often reflects that the number of candidates matches the number 
of seats and that the users do not conceive of the user boards in terms of a 
representative democracy. Anyway, a head count reveals that the active involvement 
in the user boards is quite high. In the related 1990s it was estimated that about 
20,000 parents were actively engaged in the user boards in the public schools. 
  
iii. iii. Board-like governance networks are relatively formalized, and often 
mandatory, governance networks that bring together the key stakeholders within a 
particular policy area. At the municipal level there are a large number of board-like 
governance networks. The Local Employment Committees are mandatory neo-
corporatist networks that monitor the local Job Centres, advice to the City Council 
in questions about local employment policy and contribute to the elaboration of the 
local Employment Plan. They also have their own funding, which they can use to 
fund their own projects for the weak unemployed. Integration Councils are non-
mandatory governance networks that bring together Immigrant and Refugee 
organizations and other civil society organizations that can help the City Council to 
produce an effective and comprehensive integration policy. The Disability Councils 
represent all the different groups of disabled people and advise the City Council 
about new political and administrative initiatives for disabled people. They became 
mandatory in 2006. The Youth Education Counselling Centres were established in 
2004. They are the nodal point in mandatory governance networks that comprise all 
the relevant stakeholders in the field of youth education. Finally, a recent police 
reform requires the police to establish a Local Police Council in each municipality in 
order to involve local stakeholders in crime prevention and the development of plans 
for the efforts of the local police.  
 
Sources: 
 
• Andersen and Torfing, 2004 
• Bogason (2001), Ch. 3. 
• Law # 1060, Law # 522, Law # 1382, Law # 474, Law # 298, Law # 538 
• Telephone interview with the chief executive manger in the municipality of Holbæk  
 
4.6 Supra-local networks 
The local governance reform of 2006 resulted in the creation of five new regions instead of the 
previously 14 counties. The new Danish regions have lost almost all the former counties’ 
service delivery functions to the new and larger municipalities. In fact, there are only delivering 
public service in the area of health care, where they are responsible for running the hospitals, 
while the municipalities are responsible for preventive health care and the provision of 
rehabilitation facilities. However, the regions are in charge for the elaboration of regional 
development plans. In order to create a broad political ownership to the regional development 
plans the Regional Councils must cooperate with the municipalities, business organizations, 
educational institutions, and other regional actors in complex regional network structures. In 
relation to the elaboration of the plans for regional business development, there have created 
mandatory supra-local networks called Growth Forums in which the municipalities, the local 
business organizations and some local trade unions are represented. There is a major research 
project that is studying the formation of governance networks in the new Danish regions, but 
the first results will not be available before the end of 2008. 
  
Sources: 
 
• Danske Regioner: http://www.regioner.dk/ 
  
4.7 Sub-local committees, councils and networks 
Compared to the other Nordic countries, Denmark was quite late to embark on the formation of 
sub-local committees, councils and networks. However, the municipal amalgamation reforms in 
1970 and 2006 increased the distance between the citizens and elected politicians and this has 
spurred the development of sub-local bodies that permits the local citizens within a particular 
geographical area to participate in the governance of local policy issues. The 1977 White Paper 
on Local Democracy distinguished between local committees where the members were 
appointed by the City Council and local councils where the members were elected among the 
local citizens. However, the While Paper concluded that it was not necessary to make any legal 
changes in order to facilitate the formation of alternatives to the local representative democracy. 
In the beginning, the development of sub-local forms of democracy was rather slow, but in the 
1980s a series of municipal experiments paved the way for some interesting new experiences 
with sub-local democracy in the municipality of Herlev. These experiences resulted in changes 
in the Law of Local Governance in order to facilitate devolution of particular policy 
competences to local committees and local councils. The legal changes triggered a proliferation 
of local committees and councils with varying degrees of success. The most ambitious 
experiment was the establishment of local neighbourhood councils in Copenhagen that ended in 
bureaucratization and fierce political conflicts. 
 
The recent amalgamation is likely to spur a new wave of experiments with sub-local 
democracy. In the Municipality of Holbæk, 18 sub-local governance networks have been 
created, which in contrast to the local committees and councils are based on the free and open 
participation of citizens, civil society organizations, business firms and public institution 
mangers rather than the election or appointment of a small group of representatives that are 
supposed to act on behalf of the local citizens. Everybody can show up to the meetings, raise an 
issue and try to get other people to join a working group that aims to deal with it. What is 
interesting about the Local Forums in Holbæk is that there is a strong connection to the City 
Council which has formed a number of Dialogue Committees that are in regular contact with 
the Local Forums and give them feedback on the issues they are raising and want to work upon. 
The idea behind the establishment of the Local Forums is to mobilize the local resources, 
competences and energies and to facilitate sub-local self-regulation. However, the Local 
Forums are not only mechanisms for sub-local self-regulation and the generated of bottom-up 
inputs to the City Council. They are also considered as natural consultation partners for the City 
Council, which will also try to recruit the Local Forums as vehicles for the development of new 
public initiatives, for example, in the struggle against child obesity. 
 
Sources: 
 
• Bogason (2001), Ch. 2. 
• Holbæk Municipality: 
 http://www.holbaeknettet.dk/go.asp?RoomID=351andLangRef=176  
• Telephone interview with the chief executive manger in the municipality of Holbæk 
 4.8 Project-related governance networks 
The most common use of local governance networks is also the most informal. The formation 
of local governance networks that round up ‘the usual suspects’ in terms of relevant and 
affected citizens and associations is quite frequent when politicians or public administrators 
want to develop a new project. However, the project-related governance networks can also be 
created from below by a range of civil society organizations that cooperate to solve a particular 
problem and decide to involve the public authorities. There are very few empirical studies of 
the use and functioning of ad hoc-based, project-related governance networks in the Danish 
municipalities. However, a recent study of the Municipality of Skanderborg provides an 
illustrative example of the decisive political influence that such networks may have. The 
Municipality of Skanderborg wanted to develop its cultural life and facilities and arranged a 
couple of citizen meetings that resulted in the formation of a dense network of public and 
private actors. The network was very active and formed a strong alliance that propelled the 
political decisions to build an expensive cultural centre with room for cinemas, exhibitions, 
rock concerts and ballet. Another and less successful network was formed in relation to the 
development of local sports facilities. 
 
Sources: 
 
• Sørensen and Torfing (2000). 
 
 
5.  Explaining local forms of governance 
In the academic literature, there are competing explanations of the recent surge of collaborative 
forms of governance (see Sørensen and Torfing, 2007). Governability theories advanced by Jan 
Kooiman (1993) and Renate Mayntz (1993b) tend to see collaborative governance as a 
functional response to the need for horizontal coordination in our increasingly complex, 
differentiated and dynamic societies. Interdependency theories advanced by Rod Rhodes (1997) 
and Walter Kickert, Erik-Hans Klijn and Joop Koppenjan (1997) tend to view collaborative 
governance as a strategic response of rational, self-interested policy actors to the need for 
exchange of material and immaterial resources within a public sector that has been fragmented 
by New Public Management reforms. Finally, integrative organization theorists like James G. 
March and Johan P. Olsen (1995) and Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell (1991) tend to 
perceive collaborative governance as a normative response to the over-socialization of the 
individuals by the state and the under-socialization of the individuals by the market. Network 
types of governance make room for relative autonomous action within a framework of shared 
norms and values. 
 
The functionalist, rationalist and normative biases of these theories are overcome by the 
poststructuralist governmentality theory advanced by Michel Foucault (1991) and Nikolas Rose 
(1999) who claimed that the new forms of pluri-centric governance are advanced as a part of an 
advanced liberal governmentality that urges the state to ‘govern at a distance’ by means of 
mobilizing a plurality of self-regulating actors and networks within an institutional framework 
that ensures conformity. Despite the structuralist undertones of this explanation, it aims to bring 
politics to the fore as the new governmentality is seen as an outcome of hegemonic struggles 
aiming to respond to the dislocation of both the statist and neoliberal conceptions of the art of 
government. Hence, the surge of governance networks is not perceived to be an outcome of 
structural imperatives, strategic actions of self-interested policy actors, or normative ambitions 
of advancing the Good Society. Rather, it is a political response to the persistent 
problematization of both statism and neoliberalism for being unable to fulfil the liberal promise 
of governing ‘each and everybody’ through the deployment of a minimal amount of force and 
resources. 
 
However, the hegemony of the advanced liberal governmentality is a general condition for the 
surge of collaborative forms of governance in all countries in the new enlarged Europe. It does 
not help to explain the differences among different countries such as the Nordic ones. As for the 
Danish case, the preliminary mapping of local forms of governance has revealed two things that 
need to be explained. First, although there is an uneven pattern, most of the local forms of 
governance are well-developed and tend to engage a lot of citizens, civil society organizations 
and business firms in the formulation and implementation of policy solutions. Second, the more 
formal types of collaborative governance in terms of municipal companies, public foundations 
and public-private partnerships that aim to mobilize the resources of private companies in order 
to enhance output legitimacy seem to be less developed than the more informal types of 
collaboration in terms of collaborative boards and supra-local, sub-local networks and project 
related networks and that aim to increase the democratic participation of individual citizens and 
civil society organizations in informal coordination and dialogue in order to enhance input 
legitimacy. 
 
The first point about the predominance of local forms of governance in Denmark can be 
explained by reference to Danish history that saw the development of a unique combination of a 
strong and modern Rechtsstaat and a well-organized civil society (Knudsen, 1991; Rhodes, 
1999). The absolutist state formed in 1660 shifted the tax burden from property to income and 
the ensuing tax revenue helped to finance the development of a modern bureaucratic state that 
was taken over by the new parliamentary democracy in the peaceful bourgeois revolution in 
1848. At the same time, the political and cultural self-organization of the farmers in the 19th 
century and the rise of the workers movement in the 20th century created a well-organized civil 
society and nurtured the idea that ordinary citizens should be able organize and make a 
difference through political participation. The gulf between the strong state and the strong civil 
society was bridged by different kinds of public-private cooperation. The institutionalized 
cooperation between state and civil society has been named ‘corporatism’, ‘the Danish model’ 
and ‘the negotiated economy’, and the local forms of governance that have been mapped above 
are merely the current expression of a long tradition for public-private collaboration. 
 
The second point about the predominance of local forms of governance based on the 
participation of civil society actors rather than market actors can be explained by a combination 
of a relatively sound public economy in Denmark after 1982 and the successive governments’ 
so-called ‘modernization plans’ that after an initial oscillation between exit and voice ended in 
a compromise between free choice of public service and voice-based user influence through 
participation in collaborative boards and networks. 
 
The small and open Danish economy was severely hit by the first oil crisis in 1973-74 that 
dramatically increased the oil prices and led to a period of stagnation and mass unemployment. 
Successive social democratic minority governments tried all the standard Keynesian cures, but 
they failed to produce an economic recovery and left the state budget with a gaping hole, which 
in 1982 forced the social democrats to surrender government power to a conservative coalition 
government. However, when in the mid 1980s the OECD and the Thatcherist revolution in 
Britain triggered the international wave of privatization, contracting out, and commercialization 
of the remaining public sector, the public budget in Denmark had already improved and that 
meant that the neoliberal marketization strategy appeared just as irrelevant as it was politically 
unfeasible. The budget improvement was a result of the introduction of what was called ‘total 
budget framework’ that meant that an increase in public expenditure in one area should be 
matched by an equivalent budget cut in another area. This fostered a new kind of budget 
discipline that soon helped to reduce the deficit and eventually produced a surplus. 
 
The total budget frames were introduced by the conservative coalition government in 1982-83. 
In the same year, the government published the first of a series of annual modernization plans 
that were meant to propel public sector reform (The Ministry of Finance, 1983). In the last 
decades there has been a constant battle between recommendations aiming to strengthen the 
exit possibilities of the citizens by turning them into consumers of public and private services 
and recommendations aiming to enhance the voice options of the citizens through their 
participation in user boards and local networks and partnerships. In the beginning, the market 
orientation was quite strong, and after a period with a more balanced emphasis on both exit and 
voice in 1988-89 (The Ministry of Finance, 188, 1989), the marketization strategy came to the 
fore again in the modernization plan from 1992 (the Ministry of Finance, 1992). However, after 
the return of the social democrats to the government office in 1993, the participatory strategy 
was revived (The Ministry of Finance, 1993), and gradually a compromise was formed between 
a soft marketization strategy emphasizing the users’ rights to free choice of public and private 
service and a participatory strategy emphasizing the users’ active participation in boards and 
networks (The Ministry of Finance, 1999). 
 
The combination of sound public budgets and the formulation of a political compromise 
privileging both the exit and voice options of the users of public service help to explain the 
predominance of local forms of governance based on the participation of civil society actors 
rather than market actors. However, there is an important additional factor that helps to account 
for the fact that the participatory forms of governance, which are particularly well developed at 
the local level in Denmark, are not so much involved in the delivery of public service as in the 
production of informal coordination. This can be explained by the recent turn to soft modes of 
guidance. Public authorities increasingly aim to regulate the behaviour of citizens, 
organizations and private companies by means of shaping their identities, their cognitive and 
normative framework, and their incentives and modes of calculation. In many policy areas soft 
guidance is much more effective than traditional forms of hard law in bringing about the 
desired outcomes. At least, soft guidance is often a necessary complement to law-like 
prohibitions and restrictions. Hence, fighting child obesity by means of formal laws and 
regulations might not take you very far, if not the prohibitive measures are combined with a 
transformation of the norms and practices that guides children in their daily lives.  Employment 
policy and integration policy are also good examples of policy areas where it is necessary to use 
soft guidance in order to transform attitudes and practices. Campaigns that aim to promote 
Corporate Social Responsibility are a case in point. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
The mapping of local forms of governance has not only showed that there are many 
institutionalized arenas for public-private interaction and negotiation at the local level, but also 
revealed that the local forms of governance that aim to involve citizens and civil society 
organizations in the formulation and implementation of local policy are more prevalent than 
those forms of local governance that aims to mobilize resources of private business firms. 
Nevertheless, all the local forms of governance tend to reduce the sovereign people’s ability to 
control political outputs and outcomes through the parliamentary chain of command, and since 
most of these local forms of governance have emerged the last 20-30 years, it is simply not 
correct when Christiansen and Togeby claim that the parliamentary chain of governance has not 
suffered any severe damage. The new local forms of governance have created, and continue to 
create, a new political reality where, on the one hand, politicians, public administrations and 
professionals and, on the other hand, citizens, civil society organizations and private firms are 
engaged in continuous interactions through which resources are exchanged and a myriad of big 
and small policy decisions are made. Exactly, how much these interactive forms of governance 
undermine the ability of the parliamentary chain of governance to control policy outputs and 
policy outcomes is difficult to measure. The high degree of decentralization in the Danish 
welfare state might give the local forms of governance a significant role in shaping and 
reshaping policy. On the other hand, recent studies show that some public managers are deeply 
involved in the metagovernance of local governance networks (Andersen and Torfing, 2004) 
and that the local governments tend to bypass the local boards and networks in cases 
concerning controversial and political sensitive issues (Bogason and Gjelstrup, 2004). Exactly 
how these and other contravening factors add up is too early to say and will require a more 
systematic research of local policy processes. However, if we continue to reduce the local 
forms of governance to an insignificant supplement to the parliamentary chain of governance 
we will not be able to envision the role and significance of the local forms of governance. 
 
The local forms of governance constitute a new political reality vis-à-vis the parliamentary 
chain of governance. Consequently, we should study the interaction between government and 
governance and how they simultaneously strengthen and weaken each other. We also have to 
assess the contribution of the local forms of governance to an effective and democratic 
governing of our complex, fragmented and multi-layered societies. In order to be able to assess 
the performance of collaborative forms of governance we must develop a clear understanding 
of what ‘democratic’ and ‘effective’ means in relation to interactive forms of governance. Such 
a clarification has only just begun. Sørensen and Torfing (2005) suggest that we measure the 
democratic anchorage of network-types of governance. Governance networks are 
democratically anchored in so far as they are controlled by democratically elected politicians; 
represent the membership basis of the participating groups and organizations; are accountable 
to the territorially defined citizenry; and enact the democratic rules specified by a particular 
democratic grammar of conduct. Other studies suggest that we assess the effectiveness of local 
forms of governance through surveys of the ex post satisfaction of different groups of actors at 
different levels (Hasnain-Wynia et. al, 2003, Teisman, 1992; and Agranoff and McGuire, 
2003). However, as there can be a thousand reasons for being satisfied or dissatisfied with a 
networked policy solution we need to establish a clear set of criteria for evaluating the 
effectiveness of collaborative forms of governance. As such, we shall suggest that the 
effectiveness of network-types of governance is a function of their ability to:  
   
1. To produce a clear and well-informed understanding of policy problems and policy 
opportunities 
 
2. To generate innovative, proactive, and yet feasible, policy options by means of bringing 
together different actors with different ideas and experiences 
 
3. To reach joint policy decisions that go beyond the least common denominator while 
avoiding severe cost shifting 
 
4. To ensure a smooth policy implementation based on a high degree of legitimacy and 
program responsibility among all the relevant actors, including client advocacy groups, 
stakeholder organizations, public administrators and politicians 
 
5. To solve key policy problems and exploit new opportunities through a flexible 
adjustment of the strategic actions of the governance network and the participating 
actors 
 
6. To create favourable conditions for future cooperation through cognitive, strategic and 
institutional learning that construct common frameworks, create interdependency and 
build trust 
 
Of course, we cannot expect local governance networks to deliver on all counts. They may not 
go all the way and local government might short cut the interactive policy process either by 
choosing among policy options produced by the network or by implementing and adjust the 
networked policy solution. Still the criteria listed above might help us to assess the 
effectiveness of collaborative governance. Further research on these matters is necessary in 
order to assess the political and normative impact of the surge of local forms of governance. 
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